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Abstract 
I evaluate the effect of inflation targeting on inflation and how it interacts with product market 
deregulation during the disinflationary process in the 1990s. Using a sample of 21 OECD 
countries, I show that, after controlling for product market deregulation, the effect of inflation 
targeting is quantitatively important and statistically significant. Moreover, product market 
deregulation also matters in particular in countries that adopted an inflation targeting regime. 
I propose a New Keynesian Phillips curve with an explicit role for market deregulation to 
rationalize the empirical evidence. 
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Inﬂation targeting (IT henceforth) has been adopted by an increasing number of central
banks since the beginning of the 1990s. This new monetary policy framework requires a
numerical objective for inﬂation, the absence of intermediate targets and a high level of
transparency and accountability of the central bank.1
Extensive research has been conducted on various aspects of this regime.2 Previous
empirical studies report contrasting results regarding its eﬀect on inﬂation: Wu (2003),
P´ etursson (2004), Vega and Winkelried (2005) and Batini and Laxton (2005) argue that it
has been eﬀective, while Ball and Sheridan (2003) and Willard (2006) provide evidence of
the irrelevance of IT for OECD countries.
An aspect overlooked in the analysis of the eﬀect of IT is the contribution of non-monetary
factors to the disinﬂation of the 1990s. As pointed out in Rogoﬀ (2003), the improvement
in central banking institutions and practice has to be considered the major factor leading
to the disinﬂation. However, he acknowledges that improved ﬁscal policy and increased
competition, both in product and labor markets, resulting from the interaction of increased
globalization, deregulation and a decreased role for the government in the economy, also
played an important role. Gerlach et al. (2009) acknowledge the signiﬁcant, although limited,
inﬂuence of non-monetary factors in the general disinﬂation observed since 1990s.
In this paper, I contribute to the literature in two ways. First, I evaluate the eﬀect of
IT on the inﬂation rate for a sample of OECD countries, controlling for other important
phenomena that contributed to the generalized disinﬂation observed in this period, with
particular attention to product market deregulation. Doing so is important because it allows
me to test whether the disinﬂation was due to the adoption of IT, product market deregula-
tion or both these factors. Moreover, by improving the ﬁt and reducing the error variance,
it yields more precise estimates of the eﬀect of IT. To my knowledge, there are no empirical
studies that analyze the eﬀect of regulation in product or labor markets on inﬂation. Instead
the focus has been on analyzing the eﬀect of reforms on the unemployment rate. Second, I
1For a discussion on the features that characterize IT and the rationale for adopting the framework, see
Debelle (1997), Debelle et al. (1998), Bernanke et al. (1999), Schaechter et al. (2000), Carare and Stone
(2003), Mishkin (2004) and Roger (2009), among others.
2The empirical research areas include the eﬀect on inﬂation rate (Laubach and Posen (1997), Neumann
and von Hagen (2002), Wu (2003), Vega and Winkelried (2005), Ball and Sheridan (2005), Willard (2006),
and with particular attention to emerging market economies: Mishkin (2000), Mishkin and Savastano (2001)
and Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002)), on the persistence of the inﬂation rate (Siklos (1999), Corbo et
al. (2002), Levin et al. (2004), P´ etursson (2004) ), on the sacriﬁce ratio (Bernanke et al. (1999), and Corbo
et al. (2002)) and on the behavior of expectations (Johnson (2002)). See also Corbo et al. (2001), Mishkin
and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), Walsh (2009) and the contributions in Bernanke et al. (1999), Bernanke and
Woodford (2005), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) and Cobham et al. (2010) for a broad overview of
the IT experience.
1estimate carefully the eﬀect using a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence (DID) panel data model taking
into account the high persistence of the dependent variable, which is essential for a correct
inference when analyzing serially correlated time series with persistent treatment.
The analysis is performed on a sample of 21 OECD countries, of which eight3 adopted IT
during the period 1985-2007, to ensure an homogeneous sample in terms of inﬂation histories
and economic and political structure. I focus on the role of product market regulation using
the Indicators of Regulation in Energy, Transport and Communications (ETCR) coded by
Conway and Nicoletti (2006). They provide the longest time-series currently available, to my
knowledge, to compare product market regulations across countries in the non-manufacturing
sectors which constitute two-thirds of economic activity and are aﬀected by import pene-
tration only to a limited extent. Conway and Nicoletti (2006) take into account market
characteristics such as barriers to entry, public ownership, excessive vertical integration and
the presence of price controls. I further control for the government budget deﬁcit as a per-
centage of GDP, to account for the stance of the ﬁscal policy, and for globalization using
the index coded by Dreher (2006) and updated in Dreher et al. (2008). Using the ETCR
indicator allows me to control for the impact on competition of domestic market policies
in non-manufacturing sectors, while including the globalization index in the empirical part
helps to control for the eﬀect of international competition on tradable goods prices.
I estimate the eﬀect of the adoption of IT on inﬂation using a panel DID estimator
with country and time ﬁxed eﬀects in order to exploit both the time and country variation
in the data. Given the autocorrelated nature of inﬂation rate and the persistence of the
treatment variable, the standard errors of the OLS estimator are biased, as pointed out in
Bertrand et al. (2004). However, OLS estimates with the inclusion of lagged dependent
variables yield inconsistent estimates in the case of short time series. For these reasons I
follow Hansen’s (2007) methodology and I estimate the model using Feasible Generalized
Least Squares (FGLS) with bias-corrected AR(2) coeﬃcients of the error term.
I ﬁnd that IT had both economically and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on inﬂation. On
average it accounts for a reduction of over 1 percentage point of inﬂation in the sample
1985-2007. Moreover, regulation has also an important eﬀect, a higher lever of regulation is
associated with a higher inﬂation rate while a one point increase in regulation leads to an
increase of over 0.65 percent in the inﬂation rate.
I further analyze whether the eﬀect of product market regulation in inﬂation targeters
and non-inﬂation targeters diﬀered. Interestingly, I ﬁnd that the level of regulation matters
3Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom are characterized
in having IT. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Portugal and United States are characterized as not having IT.
2more in the inﬂation targeters countries, both before and after the adoption of the new
regime, than the non-inﬂation targeters. Moreover, the change in regulation, which can be
seen as a measure of deregulation reforms, has a much larger impact in the inﬂation targeting
countries than in the control group.
To understand better how deregulation impacted on inﬂation, I next propose a New
Keynesian Phillips curve with an explicit role for market deregulation. Following Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2003), I use a time varying elasticity of substitution between goods to proxy
for the level of regulation in the economy.4 In the model, a higher elasticity of substitution
represents a lower market power of the ﬁrm, lower barriers to entry or lower regulation. I
assume, consistently with the data, that the elasticity over time rises during the deregulation
period. I simulate a general equilibrium model that replicates the timing of the disinﬂation
in the IT countries and ﬁnd an initial decrease in inﬂation rate due to product market
deregulation and a permanent disinﬂation only afterwards.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 brieﬂy summarizes the related
literature. Section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 explains the empirical methodology.
Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 explains the model and the simulation
results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The popularity of IT has lead to a growing number of studies evaluating the beneﬁts of
this regime. Ball and Sheridan (2003) use a cross-section DID with a sample of 20 OECD
countries and show that countries that started with an higher than average inﬂation rate at
the beginning of the sample tended to revert to the mean as time progresses. Thus, there
is evidence of simple regression to the mean. Willard (2006) conﬁrms Ball and Sheridan’s
results using a cross-section model for 22 OECD countries with quarterly data. However, the
use of cross-sectional data limits the scope of the analysis since IT was adopted at diﬀerent
points in time and collapsing the data in pre- and post-IT periods leads to less precise
estimates.5
On the other hand, Wu (2003), using a panel data DID methodology on the same sam-
ple as Willard (2006), shows that the IT countries experienced a decrease in their average
4A stochastic elasticity of substitution is usually used in the DSGE models as a short cut to introduce
supply-side shocks.
5Inﬂation targeters adopted the new regime at diﬀerent points in time, so the divide between the pre-
and post-treatment periods can only be an arbitrary date and the the variables’ averages are computed over
slightly diﬀerent time ranges. Moreover, the estimates may be less precise because the data aggregation
reduces the number of data points.
3inﬂation rates, with no evidence of mean reversion. However, he controls for time and
country ﬁxed eﬀects and includes a lag of the dependent variable among the regressors, lead-
ing to potential bias in the estimates. Hyvonen (2004) studies the convergence of inﬂation
across countries and concludes that it is the result of similar policies or common objectives.
P´ etursson (2004), using diﬀerent samples for only IT countries, ﬁnds evidence of a disinﬂa-
tionary eﬀect of IT. His results are conﬁrmed also when using a panel data set including both
inﬂation targeters and non-inﬂation targeters. Vega and Winkelried (2005), using a sample
of 23 countries with IT and 86 without IT, account for a possible endogenous selection in
the IT group by performing propensity score matching. They ﬁnd that the adoption of IT
reduces the mean and, to a lesser extent, the persistence of inﬂation in both industrialized
and developing countries. Other studies, including Batini and Laxton (2005), analyze the
experience of emerging economies in particular and ﬁnd a beneﬁcial eﬀect of IT.
One contribution of this paper is to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of IT while controlling for
other factors recognized by the literature as potential causes of global disinﬂation in the
1990s. In discussing the reduction of inﬂation in the 1990s, White (2008) concludes that
both domestic factors, such as a more eﬀective monetary policy and a decrease in domestic
regulation, and international factors, such as a global “saving glut” and an increase in global
competition, contributed.
On the other hand, Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010) assess the importance of global factors for
domestic inﬂation and their study supports the increasing attention given to global factors
in the conduct of monetary policy. Similarly, Borio and Filardo (2007) argue that the
dependence of inﬂation on solely domestic factors has declined and the relevance of global
factors has increased.
For the reasons noted by Rogoﬀ (2003), I focus on the role of the increased level of
competition. While there is an extended literature on the role of regulation in explaining
unemployment6, to my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that uses the index coded by Conway
and Nicoletti (2006) in a study on the determination of inﬂation.
3 Data and Preliminary Evidence
In this section I discuss the classiﬁcation of countries as having, or not having, IT; review
the behavior in the two groups of countries and explain the measures of product market
6See Boeri et al. (2000), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005), Griﬃth et al. (2006), Berger and Danninger
(2006), Amable et al. (2006), Bassanini and Duval (2006) and Fiori et al. (2007) for an empirical analysis.
While see Amable and Gatti (2001), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Ebell and Haefke (2003) and Spector
(2004) for a theoretical analysis. Moreover, see Schiantarelli (2008) for a general overview of the eﬀects of
product market regulation.
4regulation, globalization and the stance of ﬁscal policy that I use in the econometric work.
The analysis focuses on a group of 21 OECD countries that have similar economic and
institutional structures, and that are exposed to similar aggregate shocks, which facilitate a
comparison of the inﬂation dynamics. My sample begins in 1985, that is, about ﬁve years
before the ﬁrst adoption of IT, and ends in 2007 due to the limited availability of data on
regulation. Table (1) lists the countries and the dates of adoption of IT.
Switzerland is not classiﬁed as using IT because the Swiss National Bank (SNB) does not
label itself as an inﬂation targeter. As discussed in Gerlach and Jordan (2011), despite the
similarities with IT, including an explicit deﬁnition of price stability and the publication of
broad-based quarterly inﬂation forecasts, the SNB has no preference for where in the 0-2%
price stability zone inﬂation should be and it has never said how fast it would seek to return
inﬂation to the range if it deviated from it. Nevertheless, some authors classify the SNB as
“de facto” inﬂation targeter since the end of 1999.7
By contrast, Spain is classiﬁed as an inﬂation targeter before it joined the euro in 1999,
even though it remained a member of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in that period.
Finland is considered having IT also after becoming a member of the ERM in 1996 in
preparation for joining the Economic and Monetary Union before joining the euro. This
classiﬁcation might be debatable, but the ﬂuctuations bands in the ERM at that time were
wide, ± 15% with respect to the ECU, and this prevented the ERM from functing as a
nominal anchor. The European Central Bank (ECB) is not classiﬁed as inﬂation targeter
due to the two pillar approach and to the fact that it stabilizes the euro-area wide inﬂation
rate, not the rate of inﬂation in individual member countries.
Figure 1 plots the average inﬂation rate for the countries with and without IT in the
period in question.8 The behavior of inﬂation in the two sets of countries follows the same
pattern up to the late 1980s, afterwards the IT countries started a faster disinﬂation. The
inﬂation rates in the two groups converge only after 2000. The disinﬂation in the IT group
occurred in 1990-1995, and consequently coincides with the bulk of the adoptions of IT.
This raises the important policy question of whether the observed decline is due to the
introduction of IT, is simply the eﬀect of global disinﬂation, or to the combination of various
institutional reforms. It is therefore of interest to investigate the importance of the reform
of the monetary policy frameworks and other factors in reducing inﬂation.
I report in Figure 2 the inﬂation rate of the inﬂation targeters and the date when IT
was adopted. The ﬁgure shows that all countries experienced a notable decrease of inﬂation
7P´ etursson (2004), Wu (2004), Vega and Winkelried (2005), Gon¸ calves and Carvalho (2008) and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2009) among others.
8An important caveat about Figure 1 is that the average inﬂation for the IT-group is computed for all
the countries that adopted IT over the sample regardless of when they did so.
5after the change in the policy regime. However, in some countries the disinﬂationary process
started earlier. This may be due to expectations of a regime change, although usually the
announcement did not precede the actual implementation9 by much and, as pointed out
by Johnson (2002), inﬂation expectations fell only after the announcement of the target.
However, many factors contributed to create the conditions for sustained disinﬂation in the
1990s.
Following Rogoﬀ (2003), I report in Figure 3 the level of product market regulation for the
inﬂation targeters and the date of adoption of IT. It is noticeable that the process started
before the adoption of IT and continued afterwards. Overall, the OECD countries have
undergone a clear decline in product market regulation over the 1990s. When comparing the
timing of the disinﬂation from Figure 1, it seems that the disinﬂationary process in some
countries began with product market deregulation.
As a proxy for product market regulation, I use the ETCR index constructed by Conway
and Nicoletti (2006), which captures the level of regulation in seven non-manufacturing
sectors: airlines, telecommunication, electricity, gas, post, rail and road freight. These sectors
represent two thirds of economic activity and the area in which domestic economic regulation
is more concentrated and has a major impact due to limited import penetration. The index
takes into account characteristics of the markets, such as the presence of barriers to entry,
public ownership of the ﬁrms, vertical integration, monopolies and the presence of legally
imposed price controls, that distort the market and contribute to keep prices high. It is
constructed as the summary of sectoral indicators which measure explicit policy settings and
formal government regulations; it varies between 0 and 6 reﬂecting increasing restrictiveness
of regulation.10 The index, which is annual and starts in 1975, was initially computed for a
sample of 21 OECD countries until 2003, but was recently updated to 2007. The new index
has many missing data points which I interpolate. I study the eﬀect of IT on inﬂation using
the updated index, and I use the original index for a robustness check. To my knowledge,
the ETCR index is the only measure of product market regulation for a long time series of
OECD countries for the non-manufacturing sector.
Another important factor is labor market regulation. Unfortunately, an annual index is
9See the cases of Canada and New Zealand. The Governor of Bank of Canada, in a memorial lecture
in 1988, stated the central role of price stability in Canadian monetary policy; the ﬁrst oﬃcial target was
announced only in 1991. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand act in 1989, enacted by the Parliament, speciﬁes
that price stability is the priority of monetary policy. Moreover, it requires the Governor and the Minister
of Finance to make periodic Policy Target Agreements regarding the price to be targeted and its allowable
range. The ﬁrst oﬃcial target was announced in March 1990. See McCallum (1998).
10All the data are stored in the OECD International Regulation Database and are collected from diﬀerent
sources including the OECD Regulatory Indicators Questionnaire (for more information see also Nicoletti et
al. (1999)).
6not available. The OECD (2004) has published an Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)
index for the late 1980s, 1990s and 2003. Fiori et al. (2007) ﬁnd that there is some evidence
that past product market deregulation have lead to labor market deregulation by aﬀecting
labor market policies or the power of the unions. In contrast, there is no evidence that
labor market deregulation has triggered product market regulation. This suggests that it is
diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀect of the two reforms and that the product market deregulation
index tends to capture the eﬀect of both.
I also use the degree of openness of the economy and the index coded in Dreher (2006)
and updated in Dreher et al. (2008) to proxy for the eﬀect of globalization on competition
in the manufacturing sector, which is more exposed to import penetration and faces higher
competition abroad. In particular, I use the index of economic globalization which is the
combination of two indexes: the actual ﬂows (trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio in-
vestment and income payment to foreign nationals, all in percent of GDP) and an index
measuring the restrictions on trade and capital (using hidden import barriers, average tariﬀ
rates, taxes on international trade (in percent of current revenue) and capital account restric-
tions). Dreher (2006) codes also a broader index of globalization which includes economic,
political and social aspects of the phenomenon.11
Another possible factor behind the disinﬂation could have been tighter ﬁscal policy. How-
ever, Rogoﬀ (2003) argues that improved ﬁscal policy played a broadly supportive, but not
decisive, role in the disinﬂation. In fact, as observed in Gerlach et al. (2009), signiﬁcant
ﬁscal consolidation in industrialized economies occurred only after 1995. In particular, the
ﬁscal position of the IT countries improved only after the adoption of the new regime, so it
seems implausible that ﬁscal factors triggered the initial disinﬂation.
4 Methodology12
I study the eﬀect of the adoption of the IT on the inﬂation rate with a panel data model,
which allows me to exploit both the time and cross-country variation. Following the microe-
conometric literature, I deﬁne the countries that adopted IT as the “treatment group” and
the countries that did not as the “control group”. I estimate the causal eﬀect of the reform
with a Diﬀerence-In-Diﬀerence (DID) estimation, where the subscript i refers to country and
t to year:
yit = bt + ci + βITit + γzit +  it (1)
11For more details see the appendix of Dreher (2006).
12Parts of this section are taken from Moretti (2011).
7where yit is the inﬂation rate, bt and ci are the time and the country ﬁxed eﬀects. ITit is
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the year in which the country’s central bank
used IT, and 0 otherwise. zit contains observable variables that change across i and t.
DID has become an increasingly popular method for the estimation of causal relation-
ships.13 However, it can lead to biased estimates of the coeﬃcients if the treatment, the use
of IT, is endogenous, and of the standard errors, if the residuals are serially correlated. I
discuss these issues below.
4.1 Biased parameter estimates
In the absence of a fully randomized experiment, the identiﬁcation of causal eﬀect requires
additional assumptions. As explained in Besley and Case (2000)14, the identifying assump-
tion requires that the adoption of IT is not systematically related to other factors that aﬀect
inﬂation. Given the impossibility of a fully randomized experiment, it is crucial that the
choice of IT is not driven by systematic diﬀerences between IT and non-IT countries. Look-
ing at the sample, it does not appear to be an underlying factor that leads some countries
to adopt IT. In fact, both groups include countries that started with high levels of inﬂation
(e.g. Greece, Italy, Portugal among the countries without IT and New Zealand among the
countries with IT) and countries that suﬀered from speculative attacks (non-IT: Italy; IT:
Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom). In fact, not all countries that started with high level of
inﬂation rate adopted IT, nor did all countries that experienced a currency crisis switch to
the new regime.
There is some research on the factors that inﬂuenced the adoption of IT. Gerlach (1999)
ﬁnds that IT tends to be adopted by countries characterized by a low degree of central bank
independence, a less open economy but more exposure to external shocks; however, he does
not ﬁnd that past inﬂation rates matter. On the other hand, Gon¸ calves and Carvalho (2008)
ﬁnd that countries with higher past inﬂation, lower debt levels and that are without an
exchange rate anchor have an higher probability of adopting IT.15
To my knowledge, the only study that tackles the issue of endogeneity is Vega and
Winkelried (2005). They estimate the eﬀect of the adoption of IT on the inﬂation rate
using propensity score matching in a cross-section of 109 countries. The sample contains 23
13See Bertrand et al. (2004) for a survey on studies using DID and their econometric issues.
14See also Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) for a macroeconomic application.
15The results may be sensitive to the sample used. While Gerlach (1999) uses a sample of 22 OECD
countries, Gon¸ calves and Carvalho (2008) use a sample of 30 OECD countries and classify Switzerland as
an inﬂation targeter. Moreover, as pointed out in Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), the adoption of IT,
while having certain exogenous structural features, requires countries to eschew other nominal targets, to
improve macro performance (the reduction of the inﬂation rate and the tightening of the ﬁscal stance) and
the strengthening of central bank independence.
8inﬂation targeters and 86 controls, and comprises both industrialized and emerging markets
economies. However this methodology has also problems. Since diﬀerent countries adopted
the IT regime at diﬀerent point in times, collapsing the data in pre and post adoption periods
is problematic and leads to the comparison of inﬂation performance from slightly diﬀerent
time periods.16 Other methodologies proposed to overcome the endogeneity issue are usually
based on cross-sectional data.17 As suggested in Besley and Case (2000), a solution is to
include in the regression any variable that potentially inﬂuence not only the policy decision
but also the outcome. In this study I control for, aside from country and year ﬁxed eﬀects,
the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio, the degree of globalization and, in particular, for product market
deregulation, as possible factors that contributed to the disinﬂation.
4.2 Biased standard errors
Even when excluding any bias in the estimation of the parameters, there is still a potential
bias of the standard errors. Bertrand et al. (2004) point out that most papers use DID to
analyze long time series of serially correlated outcomes with persistent treatments. These
factors reinforce each other and they might lead to a severe underestimate of the standard
errors of the estimated parameters. This study is not immune to this issue since I use time
series of yearly data for inﬂation, which is autocorrelated, and a persistent treatment, since
the decision to adopt IT is rarely reversed (only Spain and Finland did so in this sample).
Bertrand et al. (2004) argue that there are two viable solutions to this problem. The
ﬁrst method is to ignore the time series information and to average the data before and after
the intervention and run regression (1) in a panel of length 2. However, this solution can be
applied only if IT is adopted at the same time, otherwise the “before” and “after” are not
the same between the treated and they are not deﬁned for the controls. Needless to say, this
is not the case in this study. The second method is to use an arbitrary Variance-Covariance
Matrix, a generalized White-like formula, to compute the standard errors.
It should be noted that the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand
side is not a solution because it is well known that it leads to biased estimates in the presence
of ﬁxed eﬀects and when the time dimension is small.18
16For inﬂation targeters: average of variables of 5 years prior and after the adoption, while for the control
group: either 1990-2004, or the 5 years before 1996 or 1998 depending on the speciﬁcation.
17Abadie (2005) suggest a semiparametric methodology using the “propensity score”, the probability of
complying with the treatment. However, he suggests the use of pre-determined observable variables in order
to estimate the propensity score, a characteristic that might not ﬁt well in a macro economic context. Besley
and Case (2000) propose to take account of the endogeneity of policy decisions using political economy
instruments, such as women’s political involvement in the adoption of health and family related issues.
However, this might be diﬃcult to implement in this context.
18See Nickell (1981), Judson and Owen (1999) and Phillips and Sul (2007). Judson and Owen (1999) show
9Hansen (2007), on the other hand, proposes a FGLS-based estimator that improves on
the suggestions by Bertrand et al. (2004), and which delivers accurate and powerful inference
in the presence of the “clustering problem” and the “autocorrelation problem”.19 Hansen’s
procedure aims at reducing the bias in the estimation of the standard errors in the presence of
autocorrelated residuals. In fact, given the model in equation (1), let   it be the residuals from
the estimation. Suppose that the variance-covariance matrix, Ω = Ω(α), is characterized by
a ﬁnite dimensional parameter α. If so, an obvious approach would be to use the ﬁtted
residuals   it to get an estimate of α. However, in a ﬁxed eﬀect model, the residuals do
not behave like the underlying errors, but like the diﬀerence between these errors and their
within-group means (˜  it ≈  it − ¯  i,w h e r e¯  i =( 1 /T)
T
t=1  it). This behavior alters the
correlation structure of the residuals when T is small, and results in the inconsistency of
conventional estimators, which fail to account for this diﬀerence. Intuitively this bias is
introduced by the subtraction of the group means from the data to eliminate the ﬁxed
eﬀects which alters the variance structure of the data when the time dimension is short. As
a result, conventional estimators of the parameters of the underlying time series model that
fail to account for this distortion of the variance structure will be biased. To alleviate this
issue, Hansen (2007, section 3) proposes a bias correction for the coeﬃcient of the AR(p)
model for the residuals simply by removing an estimate of this bias from the OLS estimator.
In this study I adapt Hansen’s bias correction procedure to the data of interest, and I
model the residuals as an AR(2) process.20
5 Empirical Results
I estimate the following equation:
πit = bt + ci + βITit + γxit + δzit + εit (2)
where πit is the annual inﬂation rate, ITit is the IT reform dummy that is equal to 1
from the year in which a country employed the IT regime21 and zero otherwise, xit is the
that even with a time dimension as large as 30, the bias may be equal to as much as 20% of the true value
of the coeﬃcient of interest.
19Where the “clustering problem” is caused by the presence of a common unobserved random shock at
the group level that leads to a correlation between all the observations within each group, and which does
not arise in the present analysis since I use only group level data. The “autocorrelation problem”, instead,
arises if the groups are followed over time and the group level shocks are serially correlated, and it might be
severe in this context since I use monthly data of an highly correlated variable. Neglecting these correlation
will bias conventional least squares standard errors.
20I verify that there is no residual autocorrelation in the residuals.
21In constructing the data, I classify a central bank as using IT in a given year if it has operated the regime
10regulation index and zit is a set of control variables. bt and ci are the time and country ﬁxed
eﬀects, respectively.
Following the preliminary analysis and the literature on global disinﬂation, the control
variables included in the regression are: the government deﬁcit as a percentage of GDP22,i n
order to account for a possible eﬀect of changes in ﬁscal policy; the economic globalization
index coded by Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008)23; and a dummy variable that
accounts for the duration of currency crises.24 The reason for including this last variable is
that several countries switched to IT after a currency crises (e.g. Finland, Sweden, United
Kingdom). Thus it is necessary to control for possible spikes in the inﬂation rate due to
the crisis. In addition to these controls, all the regressions are estimated with country ﬁxed
eﬀects, that account for other systematic diﬀerences across countries, and time ﬁxed eﬀects,
that account for common shocks to the inﬂation rate.
Among the regressors, particular attention is paid to the role of product market deregu-
lation for which I use either the level of regulation (ETCR), or its change (ΔETCR).
Results for the sample 1985-2007 are reported in Table 2. In the ﬁrst column I use
only the IT dummy; in the second column I use only the level of product market regulation
(ETCR); then include both the IT dummy and ETCR in the third column. The results show
that both policies had an important eﬀect in the reduction of the inﬂation rate. The eﬀect of
the adoption of IT is large and statistically signiﬁcant, leading to a decrease in the inﬂation
rate of over one percentage point depending on the control used for regulation. The eﬀect of
regulation is also large and statistically signiﬁcant: an higher level of the ETCR index (that
is, more regulation) is associated with higher inﬂation (second column), while, a one point
increase in the ETCR index leads to an increase in the inﬂation rate of over 0.65 percentage
point in the inﬂation rate (fourth column).
Furthermore, the Globalization variable has a negative sign as expected when the IT
dummy is on its own or together with ΔETCR, implying that countries that are more open
tend to have lower inﬂation. However, when ETCR is used Globalization is positive and
signiﬁcant which is surprising. The sign of the Deﬁcit ratio variable is always negative even
though the coeﬃcient is very small, casting doubt on role of improved ﬁscal policy in the
disinﬂationary process.
Table 5 reports the results for the sample 1985-2003, using the regulation index before
for at least six months.
22The data come from IFS and OECD.
23I also estimate the same regression using openness to trade, deﬁned as the sum of import and export as
a percentage of GDP, which has a positive rather than negative sign as expected, while the other coeﬃcients
of interests have similar results. In the interest of brevity, these estimates are not reported.
24Source is Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf dataset which is available only till 1999, but which I have updated till
2007.
11the update, and Table 6 for the sub-sample 1989-2007. It is worth noticing that the eﬀect of
deregulation reforms (ΔETCR) is larger in the 1985-2003 sample while it is not signiﬁcant
in the sample 1989-2007, signaling the possible initial contribution of deregulation in the
disinﬂationary process. However, the eﬀect of the level of regulation (ETCR) is statistically
signiﬁcant in both samples, even though it is larger in the 1985-2003 one. The eﬀect of IT
is instead smaller in the sample 1985-2003 and larger in the sample 1989-2007 showing the
more persistent eﬀect of IT in reducing inﬂation.
I, then, analyze whether the eﬀect of product market deregulation diﬀered between the
countries that adopted IT and those that did not. Table 3 reports the estimates distinguish-
ing the eﬀect of regulation and deregulation between countries that adopted IT at some point
in time and those that never did. I ﬁnd that the eﬀect on inﬂation of the level of regulation
is almost half for the non-inﬂation targeters, 0.810 rather then 1.641 (see the ﬁrst column),
while the change in regulation has a ten-times smaller eﬀect and it is statistically signiﬁcant
only at the 10% level, 0.167 rather than 1.686 (see the third column). This provides evidence
that deregulation played a more important role in the disinﬂationary process in IT countries.
In Table 4 the results are reported distinguishing the eﬀect of regulation and deregulation
between IT countries, before and after the adoption, and for non-IT countries. The eﬀect of
the level of regulation is larger in the IT countries, both before and after the adoption, than
non-IT countries. Moreover, the eﬀect of deregulation reforms (ΔETCR) is larger before the
adoption and statistically signiﬁcant in both cases. It is small and statistically signiﬁcant
at only 10% level for countries that did not adopt IT. These results show that both IT and
product market deregulation helped reducing inﬂation. There is also evidence of a reinforcing
eﬀect of the two reforms with deregulation being more eﬀective in IT countries than in non
IT countries. Moreover, when ΔETCR is used the results suggest that deregulation had a
larger impact on inﬂation before the adoption of IT.
6 The Model
6.1 The Phillips Curve
The empirical analysis shows that IT was successful in reducing inﬂation but also that the
deregulation in the product market played a role. For this reason it is important to take
deregulations into account when analyzing the inﬂation dynamics. Moreover, the eﬀect of
deregulation was particularly relevant at the beginning of the disinﬂation process and there
is also some evidence of mutually reinforcing eﬀect of the two sets of reforms.
Next, I propose an extension of the basic New Keynesian model with time-varying elas-
12ticity of substitution between goods. This allows me to analyze both the role of deregulation
in the reduction of inﬂation and to rationalize the timing of disinﬂation observed in the data.
I take from Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) the idea of proxing product market regulation
with the elasticity of substitution between goods. In their paper, the elasticity of substitu-
tion depends on product market regulation through two channels. The ﬁrst is the number of
ﬁrms, which ultimately depends on the entry cost. The second is a generic taste parameter,
an increase of which can be viewed indicating a higher substitutability between goods due
to policies such as a reduction in trading barriers. I assume, consistent with the data, that
the elasticity of substitution is not stochastic as in Steinsson (2003) (a way to introduce cost
push shocks), but it grows at a given rate during the reform period, to remain constant at
a higher level thereafter. In fact, the regulation index decreased in all OECD countries, but
in particular in the IT countries, before the adoption of the new regime.
I derive the New Keynesian Phillips curve in an environment of monopolistically com-
petitive ﬁrms, with staggered price setting ` al aC a l v o ,w h e r eaf r a c t i o n( 1− ω) of ﬁrms are
allowed to reset their prices every period. Each ﬁrm j produces a diﬀerentiated product and
faces the standard demand function:
cjt =

pjt
Pt
−θt
Ct (3)
where pjt and cjt are the nominal price and output of the good j and Pt and Ct the
corresponding aggregate values. The only diﬀerence with the standard framework is that
the elasticity of substitution θt is assumed to vary over time instead of being ﬁxed. The price
pjt is set by the ﬁrms to maximize the future stream of proﬁt, which takes also into account
the probability of adjusting the price in the future periods. Thus:
p
∗
jt =a r gm a x
pjt
Et
∞ 
i=0
ω
iΔi,t+i

pjt
Pt
− ϕt+i

cjt+i
where Δi,t+i is the stochastic discount factor, equal to βi(Ct+i/Ct)−σ,a n dϕt+i the real
marginal cost. Since all ﬁrms that adjust the price in time t have the same objective function,
they will all choose the same price p∗
t. Substituting the demand function (3) into the objective
function and solving the ﬁrst order conditions of the optimization problem results in the
following expression for the optimal price of the forward looking ﬁrms:
p∗
t
Pt
=
Et
∞
i=0(ωβ)i C
1−σ
t+i ϕt+i θt

pt+1
Pt
θt
Et
∞
i=0(ωβ)iC
1−σ
t+i (θt − 1)

pt+1
Pt
θt−1 (4)
13Loglinearizing equation (4) around the steady state yields
ˆ p
∗
t =( 1− ωβ)Et
	
∞ 
i=0
(ωβ)
i


ˆ ϕt+i +ˆ pt+i −
1
¯ θ − 1
2 ˆ θt+i


or
ˆ p
∗
t =( 1− ωβ)


κˆ xt +ˆ pt −
1
¯ θ − 1
2 ˆ θt


(5)
where ¯ θ is the steady state level of θt. In order to write equation (5) in terms of the
output gap xt, I use the relationship ϕt = κxt. Using the expression for the price index and
recalling that only a fraction 1 − ω of the ﬁrms adjust the price in period t, I obtain the
following expression:
ˆ p
∗
t − ˆ pt =
ω
1 − ω
πt (6)
where the inﬂation rate πt =ˆ pt−ˆ pt−1. Substituting the optimal price rule in equation (5)
into equation (6), after some manipulation, I obtain a version of the New Keynesian Phillips
curve that explicitly takes into account the time-varying elasticity of substitution (hats are
omitted):
πt = λxt − γθt + βEtπt+1
where:
λ =
(1 − ω)(1 − ωβ)
ω
κ
γ =
(1 − ω)(1− ωβ)
ω(¯ θ − 1)2
Instead of including in the model an IS equation and an interest rate rule, I follow Mankiw
and Reis (2002) and keep the speciﬁcation as simple as possible, modeling the demand side as
m = p+y,w h e r em is the nominal GDP. This can be viewed as a quantity-theory approach
to aggregate demand, where m is interpreted as the money supply with constant log velocity.
Alternatively, m can be viewed more broadly as the incorporating the any other variables
that shift aggregate demand. By simplifying the demand side, I can focus better on the link
between deregulation and inﬂation.
146.2 Simulation
Despite the fact that my data are yearly, I simulate the model for quarterly data to produce
results that are easier to interpret in the light of the existing literature. Following Steinsson
(2003), I set the elasticity of substitution equal to 5. Following Gali and Gertler (1999), I set
the output elasticity of marginal cost κ to 2. I also set β to 0.95. I assume that the elasticity
of substitution θ grows at a rate of 0.025 per year for 5 years (between period 30 to 50), and
remains constant afterwards. I also assume that the initial inﬂation rate is 1.5% and that
money growth is constant. However, two years after the beginning of deregulation (period
38), a disinﬂationary policy of constant money supply is implemented to bring inﬂation to
zero. The results of the simulation for the inﬂation rate are summarized in Figure 4.
The eﬀect of the monetary policy alone, as shown in the upper left panel of the ﬁgure, is
to immediately bring inﬂation to zero. This pattern depends on the purely forward looking
nature of the New Keynesian Phillips curve. The eﬀect of deregulation alone, with no change
in monetary policy, is a decrease of the inﬂation rate only in the period of deregulation. As
shown in the upper right panel of Figure 4, when the elasticity of substitution stabilizes
at the higher level, the inﬂation rate returns to the previous level. When both reforms are
considered, the timing of the disinﬂation resembles that observed in the data: an initial
decrease in the inﬂation rate due to the eﬀect of deregulation and then the permanent eﬀect
due to disinﬂationary monetary policy.
The simulation thus show that deregulation, modeled as an increase in the elasticity
of substitution, leads to a temporary decrease in the inﬂation rate during the deregulation
period, even without a change in monetary policy. This suggests that the permanent decline
in the inﬂation observed in the data was due to the change in the monetary policy framework.
7C o n c l u s i o n
A number of authors have studied the impact of the adoption of IT on inﬂation, reaching
conﬂicting results. One potential reason is that, around the time IT was adopted, a number
of countries also experienced important product market deregulation. Including product
market deregulation explicitly into the analysis is helpful for two reason. First, it permits an
analysis of the relative importance of IT and product market deregulation in the disinﬂation
period. Second, by improving the ﬁt of the regression and reducing the error variance, it
makes it possible to obtain more precise estimates of the eﬀect of IT on inﬂation.
I estimate the model using a DID panel. Since the dependent variable, the rate of
inﬂation, is highly autocorrelated and the treatment, the IT dummy, is persistent, I correct
15the bias in the standard errors with the methodology proposed by Hansen (2007). The
main empirical ﬁnding is that both IT and product market deregulation played a role in the
disinﬂation process, as one might have expected. Furthermore, product market deregulation
(measured as the change in the ETCR index) was associated with a sharper fall of inﬂation
in IT countries, in particular before the adoption of IT.
I also study a simple New Keynesian model to understand better how product market
deregulation may have impacted on inﬂation. Following Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), I
model product market deregulation as time varying elasticity of substitution between goods
and I derive a New Keynesian Phillips curve. The eﬀect of deregulation leads to a temporary
decrease in the inﬂation rate, while permanent disinﬂation is achieved only with monetary
policy.
This paper shows the importance of the regime of IT in reducing inﬂation, but also ﬁnds a
relevant contribution of product market deregulation. While the improvements in monetary
policy institutions and practice still remain the major factor in the disinﬂationary process
of the 1990s, non-monetary factors, such as product market deregulation, contributed to the
achievement of low inﬂation.
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Figure 1: Average Inﬂation Rate for IT and Non-IT Countries, quarterly data,
1985-2007.
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Notes: The solid line is the average inﬂation rate for IT countries (countries that have adopted IT at some
point), the dashed line the average inﬂation for countries that never adopted IT.
Source IFS.
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Notes: Average annual inﬂation rate for IT countries. The vertical line signals the IT adoption date.
Source IFS.
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Notes:Average level of regulation measured by the ETCR index in the IT countries. ETCR is the aggregate
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Gas, Post and Rail Road). The index goes from 0 to 6, with 0 indicating the lower level of regulation and 6
the highest level of regulation in the market. The vertical line signals the IT adoption date.
Source OECD.
23Table 1: OECD Countries in the Sample
IT countries (quarter of IT adoption)
Australia Q1 1993 Norway Q4 2000
Canada Q1 1991 Spain Q4 1994 Q4 1998
Finland Q1 1993-Q4 1998 Sweden Q1 1993
New Zealand Q1 1990 United Kingdom Q4 1992
Non-IT countries
Austria France Ireland Netherlands
Belgium Germany Italy Portugal
Denmark Greece Japan Switzerland
United States
Notes: Finland and Spain are IT countries until joining the European Monetary Union.
Source: Central banks’ webpages.
Figure 4: Simulation Results
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Notes: Behavior of the inﬂation rate in response to policies. Top left: permanent disinﬂation from period
38. Top right: deregulation from period 30 to 50, with a rate of growth of the elasticity of substitution of
0.025. Bottom: deregulation from 30 to 50 and permanent disinﬂation after period 38.
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25Table 3: Estimates of equation (2) using GLS, annual data, sample 1985-2007.
ETCR ΔETCR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IT -0.654*** IT -1.217***
(0.114) (0.101)
ETCR it cnt 1.641*** 1.848*** ΔETCR it cnt 1.686*** 1.800***
(0.055) (0.053) (0.199) (0.195)
ETCR nnIT 0.810*** 0.823*** ΔETCR nnIT 0.167* 0.136
(0.027) (0.029) (0.093) (0.091)
Deﬁcit ratio -0.011*** -0.001*** Deﬁcit ratio -0.029*** -0.031***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Globalization 0.003*** 0.008*** Globalization -0.078*** -0.084***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crisis 0.530*** 0.525*** Crisis 0.636*** 0.641***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
R2 0.292 0.272 R2 0.306 0.252
Notes: Dependent variable (π): yearly inﬂation (CPI annual percentage change). Source: IFS. IT: inﬂation
targeting dummy (half year rule) equal to 1 from the year of adoption of IT. ETCR IT cnt is the aggregate
indicator of regulation (ETCR) for the countries that adopted IT at some point. The index ETCR is obtained
as the average of indicators in six main sectors (Airlines, Telecom, Electricity, Gas, Post and Rail Road). The
index goes from 0 to 6, with 0 indicating the lower level of regulation and 6 the highest level of regulation in
the market. ETCR nnIT instead is the ETCR index for countries that never adopted IT. ΔETCR IT cnt is
the absolute change in the ETCR index for countries that adopted IT and ΔETCR nnIT for the ones that
did not. Deﬁcit ratio is the government deﬁcit as a percentage of GDP. Source: IFS and OECD. Globalization
is the index of economic globalization coded by Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008). Crisis is the (lagged)
dummy variable for currency crises duration. Source Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf dataset (available only till 1999,
I updated it till 2007). The regressions include country and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors adjusted
using the methodology proposed by Hansen (2007) are reported in brackets. ***=signiﬁcant at the 1% level;
**=signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *=signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
26Table 4: Estimates of equation (2) using GLS, annual data, sample 1985-2007.
ETCR ΔETCR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IT -1.117*** IT -1.332***
(0.407) (0.118)
ETCR before 1.606*** 1.744*** ΔETCR before 2.081*** 1.563***
(0.056) (0.052) (0.400) (0.380)
ETCR after 1.787*** 1.607*** ΔETCR after 1.296*** 2.048***
(0.087) (0.075) (0.394) (0.353)
ETCR nnIT 0.793*** 0.817*** ΔETCR nnIT 0.164* 0.142
(0.027) (0.028) (0.093) (0.093)
Deﬁcit ratio -0.010*** -0.012*** Deﬁcit ratio -0.029*** -0.032***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Globalization -0.001** 0.006*** Globalization -0.077*** -0.088***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crisis 0.5268*** 0.521*** Crisis 0.644*** 0.639***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
R2 0.292 0.284 R2 0.306 0.262
Notes: Dependent variable (π): yearly inﬂation (CPI annual percentage change). Source: IFS. IT: inﬂation
targeting dummy (half year rule) equal to 1 from the year of adoption of IT. ETCR before and ETCR after
indicate the regulation index (ETCR) before and after the adoption of IT respectively, while ΔETCR before
and ΔETCR after indicate the absolute change of the ETCR index before and after the adoption of IT.
ETCR nnIT and ΔETCR nnIT are the ETCR index and the absolute change of the index respectively for
countries that never adopted IT. The index ETCR is obtained as the average of indicators in six main sectors
(Airlines, Telecom, Electricity, Gas, Post and Rail Road). The index goes from 0 to 6, with 0 indicating the
lower level of regulation and 6 the highest level of regulation in the market. Deﬁcit ratio is the government
deﬁcit as a percentage of GDP. Source: IFS and OECD. Globalization is the index of economic globalization
coded by Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008). Crisis is the (lagged) dummy variable for currency crises
duration. Source Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf dataset (available only till 1999, I updated it till 2007). The
regressions include country and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors adjusted using the methodology proposed
by Hansen (2007) are reported in brackets. ***=signiﬁcant at the 1% level; **=signiﬁcant at the 5% level;
*=signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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